

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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3 CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS, :

4 OHIO, ET AL. , :

5 Petitioners :

6 v. : No. 01-1269

7 BUCKEYE COMMUNITY HOPE :

8 FOUNDATION, ET AL. :

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10 Washington, D. C.

11 Tuesday, January 21, 2003

12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral

13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at

14 11:03 a.m.

15 APPEARANCES:

16 GLEN D. NAGER, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the

17 Petitioners.

18 DAVID B. SALMONS, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor

19 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on

20 behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, in

21 support of Petitioners.

22 EDWARD G. KRAMER, ESQ., Cleveland, Ohio; on behalf of the

23 Respondents.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (11:03 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4 next in Number 01-1269, the City of Cuyahoga Falls versus
5 Buckeye Community Hope Foundation.

6 Mr. Nager.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF GLEN D. NAGER

8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

9 MR. NAGER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and
10 may it please the Court:

11 In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
12 Circuit held that a municipality may be held liable in
13 damages because it withheld the issuance of building
14 permits for a proposed housing project pending a citizen-
15 initiated referendum election on the ordinance authorizing
16 that housing project.

17 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit failed to
18 appreciate that the municipality's actions here were all
19 taken pursuant to pre-existing procedures set forth in the
20 city's charter, procedures that the city followed to the
21 letter. As nondiscretionary acts taken in the normal
22 prescribed course, the municipality's actions here were
23 necessarily rational ones taken without discriminatory
24 motives and without treating the respondents here any
25 differently than any other beneficiary of an ordinance

1 would have been treated that was subject to a petition.
2 And for that reason, we respectfully suggest that the
3 Sixth Circuit --

4 QUESTION: There's no evidence of some kind of
5 misbehavior on the part of the city other than the bare
6 claim that they refused to issue the permit during the
7 process of the referendum?

8 MR. NAGER: That's correct, Justice O'Connor.
9 Every official action of the city here favored the
10 respondents. The city planning commission recommended
11 approval of the housing project and of the site plan
12 authorizing the housing project. The city council voted
13 in favor of the housing project.

14 QUESTION: Wasn't there some evidence that some
15 city official was -- sought to delay the proceedings for a
16 period of time, not -- not officially. It didn't take --
17 pass any resolution, but didn't they oppose immediate
18 action on a couple of occasions?

19 MR. NAGER: Justice Stevens, prior to the city
20 council voting on the -- the ordinance to approve the
21 project, there was a lot of public debate, and in that
22 public debate, there were city officials who said we --
23 we need to take time to hear the citizens -- citizens'
24 concerns. We need to take time to understand what we're
25 doing, and there were even comments, we should fight this.

1 We should fight this and delay this.

2 QUESTION: Supposing one of those comments said
3 we should fight this because we don't want
4 African-Americans to -- to move where they're going to
5 move, would that make any difference?

6 MR. NAGER: It -- it could make a difference.

7 QUESTION: Because even -- if that had happened,
8 it would still be true, as you pointed out earlier, that
9 every official action taken by the city was favorable to
10 the -- your opponents.

11 MR. NAGER: Well, if -- if the actions were
12 taken favorably to the opponents, it couldn't make a
13 difference because at that point the alleged statement
14 wouldn't have any connection to an adverse action.
15 That -- that's the important point in this case because in
16 order to have discrimination, either in violation of the
17 Equal Protection Clause, or in violation of the Fair
18 Housing Act, you not only have to have a motive, you have
19 to have adverse differential treatment by the person --

20 QUESTION: So what -- I'm trying to be sure
21 I understand. I -- I think I understand your position.
22 Is -- your position is that even if this ambiguous
23 evidence was -- clearly showed racial hostility and that's
24 why we're trying to delay it, there still would be no
25 cause of action because everything the city did was in

1 favor of -- officially was in favor of --

2 MR. NAGER: That -- that's correct.

3 QUESTION: So that really, we don't have to try
4 and draw -- to decide whether or not inferences of
5 improper motive can be drawn from those statements.

6 MR. NAGER: That's correct because in this case,
7 all of the city's actions either favored the project or
8 nondiscretionary actions.

9 QUESTION: Now, what if the city had taken the
10 same official action that it took in this case, and every
11 official action either favored or was at least neutral,
12 and yet the city officials went out and -- and whipped up,
13 in effect, anti-black sentiment and -- and urged the
14 filing of the application for the referendum, would the
15 answer -- would the -- would the result be the same,
16 that -- that there would be no way that the city could be
17 held liable?

18 MR. NAGER: The short answer to that question is
19 the answer would be the same. Of course, if the
20 referendum were enacted, it went to a vote and it were put
21 into effect and it was racially motivated, that action
22 would be subject to challenge because that would be, in
23 fact, an action of the city because they would have
24 adopted, under your hypothetical facts, an ordinance that
25 could allegedly have a discriminatory intent.

1 QUESTION: But isn't the -- isn't the delay
2 simply a -- even the delay in -- in an instance in which
3 the ordinance is defeated simply a lesser degree of
4 damage, but which would, nonetheless, be -- be subject to
5 a claim?

6 MR. NAGER: And the answer to that is no. And
7 the answer to that is no because the delay that happened
8 here is the delay that would happen with regard to any
9 referendum that was subject to a referendum petition. And
10 the record here is quite clear --

11 QUESTION: Well, it -- there's -- there's no
12 question that it -- it would, but is -- is the -- is
13 either the -- the statute in question here or the Equal
14 Protection Clause blind to an obvious reason for the
15 delay? In other words, I -- I quite agree. We start with
16 the assumption that mere delay in governmental processes
17 does not give rise to a cause of action, but when the
18 delay is induced by city officials for a racially
19 discriminatory reason, aren't we then in a different case?

20 MR. NAGER: Well, it's a different case, but
21 it's not different outcome here, and the --

22 QUESTION: Why shouldn't it be a different
23 outcome?

24 MR. NAGER: Well, because under Monell and its
25 progeny, as well as this Court's State action cases, the

1 municipality can be held liable only in damages only if
2 the city -- an official with the authority to authorize it
3 has authorized the discriminatory action that you're
4 talking about. In this specific instance, the -- every
5 official action favored the project, and the delay that
6 you're talking about was authorized by a city charter
7 created 30 years before the fact.

8 QUESTION: Well, the mechanism -- the mechanism
9 is provided by the city charter.

10 I guess what I'm getting at is that if city
11 officials -- let's just say the mayor, for the sake of
12 argument, or the mayor and the city council -- in effect,
13 do not establish a policy in the sense that they say, we
14 want to stop black housing projects, but they follow a
15 policy of trying to make it difficult for those housing
16 projects to be approved, and one way they do that is by
17 spurring the -- the request for referendums. Assuming
18 we're going to apply the Monell rule here, isn't that a
19 policy position of the city even within the meaning of
20 Monell?

21 MR. NAGER: No, because they wouldn't have the
22 authority to do that. There's a difference between six
23 city council members voting at a city council meeting as
24 to what the actions of the city are, and six city council
25 members going out on their own in their private capacities

1 and expressing their views as citizens, and -- and trying
2 to get other citizens to agree with them as to their
3 private views.

4 QUESTION: But not --

5 QUESTION: Well, supposing, Mr. Nager, that you
6 have, say, a -- say, a seven-member city council and it's
7 confronted with a project like this. And one of the seven
8 members of the city council says that, you know, he's
9 opposed to this because he doesn't want African-Americans
10 moving into this area. The other six members of the city
11 council simply treat the thing on the merits. Does the
12 action of this one individual taint the whole action of
13 the city?

14 MR. NAGER: Well, it shouldn't. Under Arlington
15 Heights and this Court's cases, the city could be held
16 liable only if those authorized, in this instance a
17 majority of the city council, had the -- the
18 discriminatory --

19 QUESTION: What if the vote was four to three?

20 MR. NAGER: Four -- if it was four to three in
21 favor of the housing project --

22 QUESTION: No. Against the housing project.

23 MR. NAGER: If -- if they had discretionary
24 power, and four of them exercised their discretionary
25 power against the housing project on the basis of racially

1 discriminatory --

2 QUESTION: Well, only one had the racially
3 discriminatory motive, one of the four.

4 MR. NAGER: Well --

5 QUESTION: The other three did it on the merits.

6 MR. NAGER: I think there, there would be a good
7 argument that they would still -- that -- that the
8 plaintiffs would have -- would have satisfied their burden
9 of showing but for the racially discriminatory motive,
10 that the housing project would have been approved. So
11 in -- in that hypothetical, which is not the facts of this
12 case, of course, they -- they would have had sufficient
13 evidence to state a claim

14 QUESTION: And your difference in the two cases
15 is, one, you have an official action taken. We deny the
16 project. Here you don't have that.

17 But suppose there had been, to take the clearest
18 case, a tape of a meeting. The mayor, the legal director,
19 the head of the city council, they all got together and
20 say, we want to kill this project and we know that the
21 most effective way to do that is through this referendum
22 because the people won't like it and they'll vote against
23 it. So they have a deliberate plan to string the thing
24 out and then, as the last act, instigate a referendum

25 And as I take it, your argument -- you would --

1 you're saying even if you have that scenario, there would
2 still be no municipal liability. Am I correct?

3 MR. NAGER: That's correct, Justice Ginsburg.
4 It's obviously our hardest hypothetical, but it's also the
5 same answer. And it -- and one of the reasons it's the
6 same answer is because, remember, under your hypothetical,
7 the notion is that if these city officials, not acting in
8 their -- exercising their official powers, but acting in
9 the role any citizen can, can go out and organize the
10 citizens of the community acting in their private
11 capacities to get a referendum on the ballot and vote
12 against it. Of course, that's what democracy is about.
13 It's about politicians taking on causes on behalf of
14 people --

15 QUESTION: Mr. Nager, I think -- I understand
16 your argument as it applies to the city, but am I correct
17 that the mayor is an individual defendant in this case?

18 MR. NAGER: He was. He was granted summary
19 judgment by the district court on the ground that there
20 was no evidence that he in his individual capacity had
21 committed any of the acts that were alleged against him,
22 and that he had not organized the campaign --

23 QUESTION: But -- but wasn't that reversed by
24 the Sixth Circuit?

25 MR. NAGER: No, it wasn't. That issue was not

1 taken up to the Sixth Circuit.

2 QUESTION: Why is he a petitioner then?

3 MR. NAGER: He's only here in his official
4 capacity. He was sued in both his individual capacity and
5 in his official capacity.

6 QUESTION: I see. So there's no individual
7 liability at stake here at all.

8 MR. NAGER: No, not -- not --

9 QUESTION: Is -- is the --

10 QUESTION: I'd like to ask a question, which is
11 these have been very interesting hypotheticals, but are
12 you going to have time to talk about the questions that we
13 granted cert on?

14 MR. NAGER: Well --

15 QUESTION: And I'm interested -- what we have in
16 front of us now at this point as issues.

17 MR. NAGER: The issue that you have before us is
18 the Sixth Circuit's judgment is -- is -- because under the
19 Sixth Circuit's view there was allegedly evidence of
20 racial bias among the citizens that the municipality could
21 be -- somehow be held liable for that. And that's wrong
22 for two reasons.

23 One, it's wrong because the municipality itself
24 has to have the discriminatory animus, and there's no --
25 not only no evidence of that here, it couldn't have been

1 the case since they -- of course, all of their actions
2 were voting in favor of it, or treating the action
3 neutrally.

4 Secondly --

5 QUESTION: Arguably the discriminatory animus on
6 the part of the citizens could invalidate the referendum

7 MR. NAGER: If it was voted on and put into
8 effect, the alleged animus --

9 QUESTION: No. Even -- even if it wasn't put
10 into effect. It -- if there were that animus, it -- it
11 could -- by our past cases anyway, if it could be shown,
12 it would -- it would invalidate the referendum. But your
13 point is that whether the referendum was valid or invalid,
14 the municipality would have had to stay the project. It
15 wasn't up to the municipality to make the judgment.

16 MR. NAGER: That -- that is correct, Justice
17 Scalia. I -- I do want to make clear that under this
18 Court's cases, the Court has never said that -- that the
19 First Amendment activity of a petition itself is subject
20 to an equal protection challenge.

21 What the Court's cases say is if there is a
22 vote, either on a bill by elected representatives, or on a
23 petition by citizens, that the end product of that, which
24 becomes a law, can be challenged, and that private animus
25 in that -- is contextual evidence for whether or not the

1 people who voted on that final product were themselves
2 motivated by discriminatory animus.

3 QUESTION: You're -- you're talking about people
4 who vote in a referendum?

5 MR. NAGER: Well, the -- the question is if
6 there's a final product, was the -- the final law, was
7 that racially motivated --

8 QUESTION: But we -- we've never said -- we've
9 never tried to examine the motives of -- of the citizenry
10 who vote in a referendum on that sort of question, have
11 we?

12 MR. NAGER: No, you haven't, Mr. Chief Justice.
13 What the Court has said is, is that intent of the law is
14 the key test, and what the Court has said in Arlington
15 Heights is because you can't look directly at the motives
16 of the people who voted on it, whether they be legislators
17 protected by the Speech and Debate Clause or citizens
18 protected by the -- the secrecy of the ballot in this
19 country, they look at other indicia to determine their
20 intent.

21 QUESTION: But Arlington Heights was a city
22 council, or --

23 MR. NAGER: That's correct.

24 QUESTION: -- was it not?

25 MR. NAGER: That's correct.

1 QUESTION: What -- what --

2 QUESTION: And here the referendum failed.

3 MR. NAGER: That -- well, the -- we don't know
4 the outcome because the respondents asked for the final
5 vote not to be certified.

6 But what is important here, I think, to address
7 the issue in this case, Justice O'Connor, is that the --
8 the position of the Sixth Circuit here is that the
9 municipality is somehow supposed to inquire behind a
10 facially neutral referendum petition and determine the
11 intent and motives of people engaged in the First
12 Amendment.

13 QUESTION: Did -- did the city have discretion
14 here to go ahead and issue building permits while the
15 referendum process was pending?

16 MR. NAGER: No, it didn't. Once the referendum
17 petition was filed, under the city charter, the -- at that
18 point, all the city council could do is repeal its own
19 ordinance or submit the ordinance to a vote of the voters.

20 QUESTION: So what is the claim in your opinion
21 that we are reviewing? I mean, I want it to be specific.
22 The Sixth Circuit, insofar as its -- insofar as we're
23 concerned, we're interested in what the lower courts held.

24 MR. NAGER: Correct.

25 QUESTION: What, in your opinion, is the claim

1 that they're reviewing? Is the claim that these three
2 individuals, the mayor, the clerk, and an engineer, acting
3 in their official capacities, violated the Fourteenth
4 Amendment or other parts of the Constitution when they
5 refused to issue the permit despite the petition and
6 despite the provision? Is that the claim? Or is the
7 claim they did something else as well? They stirred up
8 the petition people, or they did some other thing.

9 MR. NAGER: Well, the -- the Sixth Circuit said
10 it was the former.

11 QUESTION: Only the first.

12 MR. NAGER: Correct. Respondents in their brief
13 have abandoned what the Sixth Circuit held and which we
14 petitioned and the Court granted cert to review to argue a
15 completely different theory.

16 QUESTION: May I ask you, Mr. Nager, is the
17 complaint in the record? I couldn't find it. In the --
18 in the papers here?

19 MR. NAGER: I don't believe that it is. No, I
20 don't believe -- I mean, it's -- it's obviously in the
21 record of the case. It wasn't reprinted in the -- in the
22 joint appendix.

23 Unless the Court has further questions, I'll
24 reserve the remainder of --

25 QUESTION: Well, I -- I do. Weren't -- weren't

1 there some other questions here, like didn't we grant cert
2 on three questions --

3 MR. NAGER: Well, you did --

4 QUESTION: Have they given up on the second one?

5 MR. NAGER: Well, they've abandoned their claim
6 that they litigated and prevailed on in the Sixth Circuit,
7 that they could proceed on the disparate impact theory.

8 QUESTION: And the last is a due process?

9 MR. NAGER: A -- a substantive due process
10 claim

11 QUESTION: Substantive due process? Yes.

12 MR. NAGER: And the Sixth Circuit held that
13 there was a triable question of fact as to whether or not
14 the city had acted rationally in proceeding forward with
15 its referendum petition. And we would say that the simple
16 answer to that was at that time, the city charter required
17 the city officials to do so and that judgment was adopted
18 by three courts until the Ohio Supreme Court several years
19 later reversed itself on what the meaning of the Ohio
20 constitution was. But the subsequent reversal of this
21 highest court's evaluation of what the law was can't
22 change the rationality of the acts at the time that they
23 were taken.

24 QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Nager.

25 Mr. Salmons, we'll hear from you.

1 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID B. SALMONS
2 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES,
3 AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
4 MR. SALMONS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
5 please the Court:

6 Respondents challenge only the delay caused by
7 the city charter's neutral, longstanding provisions
8 facilitating the orderly processing of citizen-initiated
9 referenda to review ordinances passed by the city council.
10 Such a challenge requires courts to balance the vital
11 First Amendment right implicated in the referendum process
12 with the equally valid goals of equal protection and fair
13 housing.

14 In this case, that balance is clear. The city's
15 actions in giving effect to the properly filed referendum
16 petition cannot give rise to liability under the Fair
17 Housing Act or the Equal Protection Clause. It is
18 undisputed that the referendum petition was facially
19 neutral and that numerous reasonable, nonracial grounds
20 supported it.

21 It is also undisputed that the city's process
22 for handling such petitions was longstanding and
23 race-neutral. Under any conceivable standard, respondents
24 have failed to provide any evidence that the referendum
25 process was tainted with discriminatory motive either on

1 the part of the city officials or the petition organizers.

2 QUESTION: Suppose it was. I mean, I don't
3 understand your brief from this point of view. You were
4 talking about an antitrust analogy. I mean, imagine a
5 plaintiff in an antitrust case deliberately, to ruin his
6 competitor -- and no one doubts it -- files a case in the
7 court. Now, no matter how evil that person was, I can't
8 imagine or I haven't heard to date under the antitrust law
9 or any other law somebody who would sue the clerk of the
10 court because he docketed the -- he docketed the -- the
11 claim -- he docketed the complaint. And according to what
12 you've said, that's what's at issue here, that they're --
13 they're simply carry -- now, I -- I need some explanation.
14 I'm bringing it up because I'm quite honestly confused
15 about that part --

16 MR. SALMONS: Yes -- yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your
17 Honor. To be sure, the analogy to the Noerr-Pennington
18 line of cases is not perfect in this case, but it -- it --

19 QUESTION: I -- I bring it up because I'm
20 confused as to how in your mind you see this thing
21 working. I -- I mean, I suppose if a city has a totally
22 evil, horrible petition for a -- for a -- for a
23 referendum, a person still could make it and the person
24 who's in charge of carrying out the -- the ministerial
25 duties himself would not be sued even if that person

1 himself was evil. So -- so what is the -- what -- what --
2 how does this all work in your mind?

3 MR. SALMONS: Yes, Your Honor. The -- the
4 approach that we recommend in our brief, Your Honor, is
5 that the Court undertake the question as to whether the
6 petitioning at issue was genuine or whether it was a sham
7 That's the same type of analysis the Court has
8 undertaken --

9 QUESTION: Assume it's a sham. It -- they're
10 evil. They're horrible.

11 MR. SALMONS: Yes.

12 QUESTION: They're terrible. I would think even
13 an evil, horrible, terrible person has the right to go to
14 the legislature and petition and that the clerks who are
15 to file that petition are themselves clerks, and they're
16 to do it even if they're evil themselves.

17 MR. SALMONS: That is correct, Your Honor.
18 I think there are two ways in which the city could
19 potentially be held liable. I think this is not a case
20 where the Court has to decide whether the city could ever
21 be held liable based on the discriminatory motives of the
22 referendum petitioners because it's clear in this case
23 that the petitioning was genuine and this isn't a sham

24 QUESTION: But what -- what --

25 MR. SALMONS: But in the situation where you do

1 have a sham --

2 QUESTION: What -- what do you mean by saying
3 the petition was genuine as opposed to a sham in these --
4 in this context?

5 MR. SALMONS: I -- I think genuine here means
6 the same it means in -- in the other contexts in which the
7 Court has used the sham doctrine, namely that it was about
8 the First Amendment activity. The -- the process that --
9 that the city here --

10 QUESTION: I just -- this is such a strange
11 argument. Why wouldn't we wait and see if some action was
12 taken by means of a referendum, passed and became law?
13 Then wouldn't we be able to say that constitutes State
14 action at that point and you would subject it,
15 conceivably, to an equal protection analysis if the issue
16 is raised, and apply rational basis or whatever it is?
17 I don't understand why you ever get to this sham action
18 and Noerr-Pennington.

19 MR. SALMONS: Certainly, Your Honor, it -- in
20 the event that you have a referendum that's actually
21 enacted into law, the Court would examine it in the way
22 that -- that you have articulated.

23 We thought it was important to point out to the
24 Court that this process by which a city ordinance is, if
25 you will, stayed pending resolution of the referendum vote

1 is a traditional and important part of the process for
2 referendums, but it is also a process that can give rise
3 to abuse if you have a petition that is a sham. It's not
4 about the First Amendment process at all. It's simply --

5 QUESTION: I don't --

6 MR. SALMONS: -- taking advantage of the delay.

7 QUESTION: I don't know what you mean by abuse
8 in a situation like this. I mean, presumably anybody has
9 a right to petition, and you know, the fact that maybe
10 they won't get the necessary votes surely doesn't make it
11 a sham

12 MR. SALMONS: That -- that is certainly true,
13 Your Honor. But -- but I think there are -- to -- to get
14 back to the original question, what I'm trying to --

15 QUESTION: The reason I'm worried, in about
16 2 minutes from now I'm going to hear the other side get
17 up, and they're going to say this is a sham. Okay?
18 I suspect. Now, that's why I want to understand the
19 relevance of this.

20 And I -- I come into this thinking if it's the
21 Nazis, the -- the most terrible racists that steal, the
22 most terrible people in the world, if they're Americans,
23 they can come in and they can vote and they can go to
24 their legislature and they can put anything they want on
25 the ballot. And the -- the people who are mechanically in

1 charge of seeing that those things are voted on, that's
2 their job, they should do it, and if those are evil and
3 terrible and contrary to the Constitution, the courts will
4 strike them down when they get passed.

5 Now, what's -- now, you explain how your thing
6 fits into that.

7 MR. SALMONS: Yes, Your Honor. First of all,
8 let me just say that there's -- there would be -- need to
9 be both an objective and a subjective component to the
10 sham standard as there is in other contexts.

11 But to try and address the question that you
12 originally posed, it does seem to us that there are at
13 least two ways in which the city can be held liable in the
14 event that you have sham petitioning. One would be that
15 if the city officials themselves were part of the sham,
16 and the other would be --

17 QUESTION: Well, wait a -- what is --

18 QUESTION: We're trying to find out what is a
19 sham. That's -- that's our basic problem. I don't
20 understand what is a sham. In the antitrust context --

21 QUESTION: You -- you haven't told us.

22 QUESTION: In the antitrust context, I
23 understand it because -- because there is the law, and --
24 and you come up with a phony -- a phony law, you know, you
25 can say it's a sham. But there's no law about

1 referendums. You could have a referendum on anything you
2 like. How can you have a wrong referendum --

3 MR. SALMONS: Well, Your Honor --

4 QUESTION: -- and thus a sham referendum? It
5 doesn't make any sense to me.

6 MR. SALMONS: Your Honor, this Court's sham
7 analysis has to do with whether or not it's actually about
8 the First Amendment activity or it's just about an effort,
9 in this case, to take advantage of the delay to interfere
10 with someone's housing rights. We think that same
11 analysis can apply here by inquiring as to whether, first
12 of all, the -- the referendum petition is objectively
13 baseless. Is there any way that that petition could
14 have -- be enacted into law and enforced?

15 If, for example, you had a petition that said no
16 minorities shall live in the City of Cuyahoga Falls,
17 clearly that's a referendum that could never go into
18 effect and never be enforced, and therefore, it may be
19 strong evidence that the process here is not about
20 changing a law of the city --

21 QUESTION: So the clerk in that case -- the
22 clerk of the court who says I'm putting this on the
23 ballot -- he's violated the law in putting it on the
24 ballot? Of course, if it's passed, it's totally
25 unconstitutional. But you're saying that the clerks

1 shouldn't even put that on the ballot? I mean, that would
2 be quite a novel proposition to me.

3 MR. SALMONS: Your Honor, I -- I'm not
4 necessarily saying that the clerk shouldn't put that on
5 the ballot, but that would be one part of the analysis in
6 determining whether or not the process was being abused
7 and it was just a sham

8 QUESTION: Well, isn't -- wouldn't it be a
9 sham -- let me just put this on the table. As I
10 understand it, the Ohio Supreme Court said that this was
11 not a legal referendum when it got all through with
12 things. And if everybody had known before the -- the case
13 started that it was an illegal referendum, that would have
14 been a sham, wouldn't it?

15 MR. SALMONS: I -- I think that very well may be
16 strong evidence that it was a sham. This was about an
17 attempt to abuse the process. It wasn't about any
18 protected First Amendment activity. And -- and in that
19 situation I think there is, in -- in addition to the
20 possibility, although I think perhaps unlikely that you
21 can hold the city vicariously liable based on the motives
22 of the citizens, I think that is a difficult question as
23 to whether the actions of -- of the referendum -- the
24 petition signers, the 10 percent who signed the petition
25 and file it, whether that action is the official action of

1 the city with regard to the petition just as the action of
2 the voters at the referendum vote is an action of the city
3 for which the city can held liable. This Court need not
4 address that in this case.

5 QUESTION: May I ask your view on the
6 hypothetical I asked to the other lawyer? Supposing it
7 was perfectly clear that the mayor and everybody else in
8 this used the referendum as a method of delaying a
9 granting of the permit and that they did so for racially
10 motivated reasons, would there be any -- any liability on
11 anybody?

12 MR. SALMONS: Potentially, Your Honor. I think,
13 again, the -- the way in which the analysis would work is
14 the Court would need to inquire as to whether the
15 petitioning was genuine in the sense that there was a
16 genuine effort to try and change the city's ordinance.
17 And if so, then the First Amendment would provide
18 immunity.

19 QUESTION: Well, there was, but they -- they
20 figured it was going to lose in the long run, but
21 nevertheless, let's assume they wanted to delay things for
22 60, 90 days, whatever it might be, because they wanted to
23 delay it on -- on, you know, this -- this project.

24 MR. SALMONS: Yes, Your Honor.

25 QUESTION: If it -- if it were clear because

1 this case is on summary judgment, so really don't know
2 what the facts are --

3 MR. SALMONS: Well, but --

4 QUESTION: -- but if there were clear evidence
5 that the mayor and everybody else act up in a racially
6 motivated reason, would there be liability in that
7 situation?

8 MR. SALMONS: I -- I think you'd need to examine
9 both the motives in -- in your hypothetical not only of
10 the city officials, but also of -- of the petition
11 signers.

12 QUESTION: Everybody. Everybody.

13 QUESTION: Are you talking about personal
14 liability or official liability?

15 QUESTION: Liability --

16 MR. SALMONS: I'm talking about the liability of
17 the city, Your Honor.

18 QUESTION: Okay. So you're talking about
19 liability --

20 QUESTION: I'm assuming everybody who opposed
21 the project was racially motivated and that could be
22 demonstrated with tape recorder.

23 MR. SALMONS: I guess the short answer, Your
24 Honor, is that even people with racial motives have the
25 right to petition their government to change the law.

1 And -- but if they -- what no one has the right to do is
2 abuse the process in order to interfere with someone's
3 fair housing and equal protection rights.

4 QUESTION: So -- so your answer would be no
5 liability in that case.

6 MR. SALMONS: If it was genuine petitioning,
7 that is correct.

8 Thank you, Your Honor.

9 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Salmons.

10 Mr. Kramer, we'll hear from you.

11 ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWARD G. KRAMER

12 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

13 QUESTION: Mr. Kramer, opposing counsel says
14 that you have, in effect, abandoned the second question
15 presented, the disparate impact question. Is that correct
16 or is it not correct?

17 MR. KRAMER: It's correct, Mr. Chief Justice.
18 We -- we have waived that claim that had been certified
19 by -- by this Court.

20 Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court:

21 The city and the Solicitor General has tried to
22 complicate what really is a very simple case. What is the
23 injury that the plaintiff is complaining about? The
24 plaintiffs have been denied unlawfully their site plan and
25 its benefits, including a building permit. City conduct.

1 Nothing to do with referendums. Nothing to do with First
2 Amendment rights.

3 The issues of liability in this case, which the
4 Sixth Circuit took up, was did the city and its officers
5 act out of discriminatory motive by delaying this housing
6 project and refusing to give effect to the site plan
7 ordinance to appease racial and anti-family prejudices in
8 violation of the Equal Protection Clause --

9 QUESTION: How could they do that if they had no
10 choice? I mean, if the law told them you have to stop the
11 project once the referendum is filed, even if in -- in
12 their heart and -- heart of hearts they were delighted for
13 racial reasons that this was the case, nonetheless they
14 had no choice.

15 MR. KRAMER: We believe that they did have a
16 choice and we cite cases to the Court from the Ohio
17 Supreme Court on page 25 of our brief that indicates that
18 the petitions did not have to be certified by the -- the
19 court -- by the city.

20 QUESTION: But didn't the lower -- the lower
21 courts didn't adopt that proposition, did they?

22 MR. KRAMER: The lower courts weren't asked that
23 question, Your Honor, because we're really talking about
24 whether or not the -- there was an official conduct by the
25 city.

1 QUESTION: So didn't they go on the basis that
2 the -- that the city officials' action was mandatory? The
3 lower courts.

4 MR. KRAMER: As I said, I don't really believe
5 the Sixth Circuit approached the -- the case from -- from
6 that particular issue.

7 QUESTION: So it didn't --

8 MR. KRAMER: There was discretion, we believe,
9 and we certainly provided evidence. And again, as -- as
10 was indicated by the Court to the Solicitor General, this
11 is on summary judgment. For example, in the record, there
12 is an affidavit from the law director for the Village of
13 Orange that we filed with our brief in opposing summary
14 judgment that indicated that there was discretion not to
15 certify the referendum

16 QUESTION: Well, but that -- that's a question
17 of Ohio law, I take it?

18 MR. KRAMER: That's correct.

19 QUESTION: And the way you sought to prove it
20 was to get an affidavit from the law director of some
21 suburb of Cleveland?

22 MR. KRAMER: As one element of proof, we
23 indicated that that showed that there was discretion. But
24 the Ohio case law indicates there are instances where, if
25 the subject was inappropriate -- and let's remember the

1 Ohio Supreme Court ruled that this was not an appropriate
2 subject for a referendum

3 QUESTION: Would it be --

4 QUESTION: But it rules that way many years --
5 many years after this case was -- went to litigation, did
6 it not?

7 MR. KRAMER: Yes, Your Honor.

8 QUESTION: And it had nothing to do with whether
9 it was racist, sexist. It -- it had to do with was it
10 administrative or legislative.

11 MR. KRAMER: That's correct, and it also only
12 had --

13 QUESTION: Do you have -- do you have any -- do
14 you have any authority to say that there is discretion to
15 reject a petition that is properly legislative?

16 MR. KRAMER: Well, the -- yes, Justice Ginsburg.

17 QUESTION: Suppose -- suppose you had a
18 legislative proposal that members of a certain race will
19 never be included in any kind of an equal opportunity law.
20 Suppose you had -- that was the referendum. Is there any
21 authority that says that under Ohio law, that couldn't be
22 put on the ballot?

23 MR. KRAMER: I don't know of Ohio law, but
24 certainly this Court's decision in Hunter versus Erickson
25 dealing with an Ohio referendum indicates that that type

1 of referendum is unconstitutional.

2 QUESTION: Well now, I don't believe that's a
3 correct statement of the holding in Hunter. I thought in
4 Hunter, this Court said that a municipality cannot make
5 racial laws subject to referendum and no other laws, which
6 is quite a different proposition from what you suggest.

7 MR. KRAMER: Well, with -- Mr. Chief Justice, we
8 are talking about the -- this Court's jurisprudence that
9 deals with the -- simply because it's a referendum, if
10 the legislature could not do this, pass a law that says,
11 for example, that African-Americans cannot own property,
12 like in Buchanan versus Warley --

13 QUESTION: If a legislature could do that,
14 would -- would we enjoin a legislature from passing an
15 unconstitutional law?

16 MR. KRAMER: And -- no.

17 QUESTION: The Federal -- the Federal Congress
18 passes unconstitutional laws all the time.

19 (Laughter.)

20 QUESTION: We've -- we've never been asked to
21 enjoin them

22 (Laughter.)

23 MR. KRAMER: And -- you're correct, Justice
24 Scalia. And we have not asked for that.

25 QUESTION: So there's a difference between

1 whether the product is unconstitutional and whether the
2 doing of it is unconstitutional. And the doing of an
3 unconstitutional referendum, as far as I know, is not
4 unconstitutional. You are entitled to pass an
5 unconstitutional referendum. We will ignore it, however.

6 MR. KRAMER: And it may subject, if there is
7 direct injury, damages to my client, and that is all we
8 have before this case.

9 QUESTION: What -- but wait. The -- the project
10 is built. Right?

11 MR. KRAMER: That's correct.

12 QUESTION: So -- so you've got your project.
13 And now what you're saying is that they violated the
14 Constitution in not giving you the permit quicker. And
15 they -- am I right?

16 MR. KRAMER: That's correct.

17 QUESTION: All right.

18 And they come back and they say, how could we
19 give it to you quicker? There were petitioners who
20 they -- a petition and the law prevents us from giving it
21 to you quicker because once a petition's on the ballot,
22 the law says we can't give it to you. Now, what's your
23 response to that?

24 MR. KRAMER: The response is that it was the
25 city's actions -- we believe the evidence that we've

1 proffered to -- in the summary judgment shows that they
2 took this action as a public-private partnership. The
3 mayor, city council people looked for -- as they -- one
4 city councilman said, any legal shred to be able to reject
5 this development.

6 QUESTION: No. But explain to me a little bit
7 better what -- their response is the reason we didn't give
8 you the permit faster is because here's the provision of
9 the law. It says once a petition for referendum is filed,
10 and it says whether it's legal or illegal, we have to
11 delay this. Now, your response to that is -- they say,
12 what should we have done that we didn't do once that
13 petition was filed. And your response is?

14 MR. KRAMER: What should be done in a case like
15 this is that there is an injury to my client. The injury,
16 whether it was discretionary or nondiscretionary, is -- is
17 not the -- the question. What was the purpose behind
18 denying the building permit? And under Arlington Heights,
19 this Court has indicated one of the things that a court
20 can look at as competent evidence is did the city
21 officials take action to appease racial bias. Even if it
22 was a nondiscretionary act, if the effect of that was to
23 permit private bias, they've committed a violation.

24 QUESTION: That's quite a proposition. If -- if
25 I have a -- you know, I'm -- I'm a racist and it really

1 makes me happy that this act, which I'm compelled to do by
2 law, hurts someone of a certain race, that renders that
3 act invalid even though I'm compelled to do it by law?
4 I don't think so.

5 MR. KRAMER: What we're saying is that it may
6 not be invalid, but it may cause liability. It can be a
7 legal act --

8 QUESTION: All right. So what I'm hearing you
9 saying -- what I'm hearing you saying in response to my
10 question is, I'm the mayor and the other, and I say, what
11 do you want me to do? The statute said, don't give you
12 the permit because the petition has been filed. What
13 could I have done? And your answer to that basically
14 seems to be, nothing. You couldn't have done anything.
15 We agree. But the petition itself was an evil petition.

16 QUESTION: Right.

17 QUESTION: I mean evil being quotes for what we
18 all know is going on. All right?

19 So it's an evil petition. And therefore, when
20 you face this evil petition, even though you couldn't do
21 anything about it, you have to pay damages because the
22 reason we were delayed was because of that process. Now,
23 is that basically your argument?

24 MR. KRAMER: Yes, Justice Breyer. We're --
25 we're saying that even if it was a legal thing to do, if

1 the act of it was because of racial or anti-family bias,
2 that would be a violation of the --

3 QUESTION: And now, the reason that that bothers
4 me, of course, is because I can think of a whole range of
5 evil legislative acts, and I can think of quasi-acts that
6 I'm not sure about, and then I can think of a lot of ones
7 I like. All right. So -- so -- but I'm worried. In the
8 first category and the second category, once we got into
9 the business of paying damages, because it turns out that
10 they are evil, that would, in fact, chill the legislative
11 process, which is a democratic process. And I think
12 that's the argument they're trying to make. So I'd like
13 to get your response to that.

14 MR. KRAMER: What I would say, Justice Breyer,
15 is that the fact that there was an evil motive behind any
16 of these acts -- and by the way, the referendum is only
17 the culmination of the acts. There was a series of
18 discretionary acts. For example, the strategy of the city
19 was to do two things. One was to delay this project
20 because they knew that there was a -- a very finite period
21 of time for our little non-profit tax-exempt developer to
22 build this project or lose their financing. So they knew
23 the longer they could delay, the more likely the project
24 would die.

25 And second of all, they wanted to make the

1 project more costly. So, for example, they required,
2 before we even talked about a referendum, a barrier wall
3 to be built before even a building permit that could be
4 issued, a 6-foot earthen wall with a 5-foot fence between
5 two conforming multi-family projects.

6 QUESTION: Your client agreed to that. Your
7 client didn't make any objection to that.

8 MR. KRAMER: My client was willing to do that
9 because he was told by the city it would smooth the
10 process over. He certainly did not waive his rights.

11 And in the depositions, the planning
12 commissioner, Louis Sharpe, specifically testified the
13 reason he was demanding that was because our project was
14 going to have a large number of children. Now, under the
15 Federal Fair Housing Act, as amended in 1988, such an act
16 may well violate the protection against -- against
17 children.

18 QUESTION: You said -- but -- but, nonetheless,
19 he didn't contest it.

20 Then you say the whole object was delay. And as
21 I see this thing unfold, the big delay is during the
22 pendency of the referendum because it was at the end of
23 February when the planning commission got this. They had
24 conditions on it, but it acted on the very same day. The
25 ordinance was approved on April 1st. As things go in the

1 zoning area, from February 21st until April 1st is not a
2 very long time, is it?

3 MR. KRAMER: No, but there was three hearings
4 and there was a great deal of public opposition. And one
5 of the reasons for the --

6 QUESTION: But the delay -- as far as -- that --
7 that's not -- the delay that you're complaining about is
8 from the moment the petition was filed for the referendum
9 until when he finally got the building permits.

10 MR. KRAMER: The actual complaint that we are --
11 where we think we were injured was the building permits
12 not being provided to us. The delay goes to the amount of
13 damages we think our client has suffered. The official
14 act that we're talking about is the building permits
15 being -- not being issued. And --

16 QUESTION: But you couldn't have expected them
17 to be issued the -- the day you filed the site plan.
18 I mean, there has to be a meeting of the planning
19 commission. There has to be a meeting of the city
20 council.

21 MR. KRAMER: That's correct, and we submitted
22 our building permits after the -- the approval by the --
23 the city council.

24 What we're talking about, Your Honor, is that
25 the city's actions in denying that building permit --

1 we're -- at this stage of the proceeding, all we're
2 talking about is summary judgment. Is there sufficient
3 evidence that a trier of fact would find that the -- the
4 actual denial was racial prejudice of city officials or
5 appeasement by city officials --

6 QUESTION: Mr. Kramer, I asked your opponent,
7 but is the -- is the complaint in the papers before us,
8 do -- do you know?

9 MR. KRAMER: Your Honor, the complaint is not in
10 the appendix, but it is in the joint appendix that was
11 filed with the Sixth Circuit. You'll find that in
12 volume I on page 37 of the record. But it's -- it's the
13 Sixth Circuit joint appendix --

14 QUESTION: I see.

15 MR. KRAMER: -- which I believe this Court does
16 have.

17 QUESTION: The thing I was curious about, to
18 tell you the truth, did you include a regulatory takings
19 claim in your complaint?

20 MR. KRAMER: No, we did not.

21 QUESTION: You did not.

22 QUESTION: Mr. Kramer, would you explain to me
23 what exactly you think the relevance of the subsequent
24 referendum was? For example, do you say the relevance of
25 the subsequent referendum to your claim for delay in

1 issuing the permit simply is the evidence that it
2 furnishes of -- of racial bias ultimately on the part of
3 city officials? Or is -- is its relevance that it
4 increased the damages otherwise attributable to the day --
5 delay in the permit?

6 How exactly should we regard the referendum?
7 You -- you understand the problem that we're all having
8 with -- with it. Precisely how does it figure in your
9 claim?

10 MR. KRAMER: It's the latter, Justice Souter.
11 We're saying that the referendum, which was part of an
12 overall scheme by city officials to delay this project so
13 that it would kill it. And so the injury that we're
14 talking about from -- from the referendum deals with the
15 city officials using that as the legal shred to be able to
16 deny the building permits. And the evidence we believe
17 that we have proffered to the Court through the summary
18 judgment motion is that there was not only citizen bias,
19 which under Arlington Heights, this Court has indicated we
20 certainly can allow -- it's competent evidence that can be
21 looked at of whether or not legislators used that bias to
22 be able to take that action.

23 QUESTION: No. I -- I understand that.

24 If -- if there had been no referendum, no
25 petition had ever been filed for the referendum and none

1 had ever been held, would you still have essentially the
2 same claim, though with a different evidentiary basis?

3 MR. KRAMER: Absolutely, Justice Souter, because
4 the -- what we are complaining about is the denial of the
5 building permit. That's the injury that --

6 QUESTION: But there would have been no denial
7 of the building permit absent the referendum, there --

8 QUESTION: You could win without the referendum.

9 MR. KRAMER: That's correct.

10 QUESTION: The referendum's the worst part of
11 your case. You -- you wish there weren't a referendum
12 Then they would have had no basis to deny.

13 MR. KRAMER: To deny in -- in this case.

14 QUESTION: No, but you -- I -- I thought your
15 claim was that -- that you would still have been delayed
16 in being issued the permits and that you would still have
17 had a claim for that. Am I -- am I wrong on that?

18 MR. KRAMER: I would say that we had some claim
19 for the time between when we submitted the request for the
20 building permits and how long it took them to be able
21 to --

22 QUESTION: And in -- in the absence of the
23 referendum, how long would that have been?

24 MR. KRAMER: That would have been a matter --
25 well, we don't know. Let me say --

1 QUESTION: Why don't you know? Because you --
2 there's a 30-day period. There's a -- the city council
3 acts on April 1st. That goes into effect in 30 days
4 unless there's an intervening referendum. So that you
5 would have had by May 1st the building permits.

6 MR. KRAMER: We don't know because in the record
7 Mayor Robart sent a letter ordering his building
8 commissioner not to issue a building permits, and that
9 was --

10 QUESTION: That was --

11 MR. KRAMER: -- even prior to the referendum --

12 QUESTION: But that was in the 30-day period
13 when they couldn't be issued because it hadn't become
14 effective yet. The -- the instruction was simply what the
15 law was, that the ordinance approved by the city council
16 doesn't become law until 30 days after that approval. So
17 that the -- the mayor, to that extent, was just telling
18 them to do what the law would require.

19 But in understanding your complaint and how you
20 are tying in the officials to the referendum, are you
21 saying that absent the official prompting, instigation, or
22 whatever you call it, that there would never have been a
23 referendum, that in -- in fact that the mayor whipped up
24 the referendum?

25 MR. KRAMER: Yes, Justice Ginsburg. We -- we

1 believe we indicated that this was not something that the
2 city responded from -- responded to from their citizens,
3 but this was a scheme where city officials, including
4 Mayor Robart with other private citizens, got together and
5 said, how can we deny this project.

6 QUESTION: But you've lost on that and didn't
7 appeal it. I mean, he'd be a very bad man for doing that,
8 and you might have a cause of action against him. But I
9 don't see any official city action involved in that.
10 Is it official city action for the -- for the mayor to
11 stimulate a referendum? How is that official city action?

12 MR. KRAMER: And we're not talking about that
13 that's something that caused a damage. What we're talking
14 about is, is there evidence that we can use to show that
15 the ultimate decision, which was to deny the building
16 permit that caused the injury -- is there evidence that
17 the mayor participated in -- to appease racial and anti-
18 family bias.

19 This is really a simple Arlington Heights case.
20 The --

21 QUESTION: If it --

22 MR. KRAMER: -- the problem --

23 QUESTION: I just want to finish -- But I just
24 wanted, before you finish, if you'd respond to something
25 Justice Stevens said, which is about regulatory takings.

1 I mean, what is in the back of my mind here, to stimulate
2 an answer, is suppose you weren't Section 8 housing.
3 Suppose you were building a hotel. And suppose the
4 referendum wasn't people who might be bigoted -- may,
5 perhaps -- I don't -- but suppose they were
6 environmentalists, and -- and suppose the constitutional
7 claim was not --

8 QUESTION: People that didn't want rich people
9 to move in the neighborhood.

10 QUESTION: What?

11 QUESTION: People that didn't want rich people
12 to move into the neighborhood.

13 (Laughter.)

14 QUESTION: Okay, good.

15 The -- the -- you see. And suppose the
16 constitutional claim were a takings claim. Now, if I
17 uphold for you here, if the Court votes for you here,
18 wouldn't it then have to say that all these environmental
19 cases and so forth -- I -- I don't want to win your case
20 for you, but I might be in my question.

21 (Laughter.)

22 QUESTION: The -- the -- you see -- see there'd
23 be quite a problem about whether a city wouldn't have to
24 pay damages every time that they make a mistake in their
25 environmental regulation and perhaps try to stop a hotel

1 and they thought they could stop it, but it turns out
2 later they couldn't. You see -- do you see the analogy
3 that's worrying me?

4 MR. KRAMER: I understand the analogy.

5 QUESTION: So what do you -- what do you --
6 what --

7 MR. KRAMER: The difference, Justice Breyer, is
8 that the -- we are asking only for the Court to look at
9 the issue of has the plaintiffs proffered sufficient
10 evidence that racial bias and anti-family bias was
11 involved in the decision to deny the building permit.
12 The referendum was part of the -- an overall scheme by
13 city officials to delay and ultimately kill this project.
14 If that is the case, then the referendum, which Ohio
15 Supreme Court has ruled was illegal to begin with -- even
16 if it was legal, we believe under your jurisprudence if
17 the motivation of the city to use the referendum was
18 unlawful, the violation occurs under the Fourteenth
19 Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.

20 With regards to your question about the
21 regulatory taking, we saw this -- this case under a due
22 process -- substantive due process, procedural due
23 process -- examination very similar, I think, to the
24 situation that's actually the exact opposite to the City
25 of Eastlake versus Forest City case, which Justice Stevens

1 is the only participating member that was on that
2 particular case.

3 QUESTION: Also there were eight other members
4 of the Court that disagreed with me if I remember
5 correctly --

6 (Laughter.)

7 MR. KRAMER: But we have a new Court, Your
8 Honor.

9 (Laughter.)

10 MR. KRAMER: And -- and we believe --

11 QUESTION: Now, you're -- you're now addressing
12 the third of the questions presented. It's the first
13 we've heard about the due process claim

14 MR. KRAMER: That's correct.

15 QUESTION: You haven't abandoned that and --

16 MR. KRAMER: Absolutely not.

17 QUESTION: -- you're still making the due
18 process claim Now, you know, this is substantive due
19 process we're talking here. Right?

20 MR. KRAMER: Well, substantive, or --

21 QUESTION: You think it's a fundamental right to
22 have a building permit granted within a -- within a
23 reasonable period?

24 MR. KRAMER: We're not talking --

25 QUESTION: It's fundamental --

1 MR. KRAMER: -- about a reasonable period.
2 We're talking about both -- we had raised both procedural
3 and substantive due process claims in the lower courts.
4 What we're saying is the process was so fundamentally
5 flawed that it rises to a -- a due process violation.
6 Whether it's substantive or procedural, we don't believe
7 is -- is really the issue here.

8 We're talking about a process where there was a
9 whole set of procedures set up by the City of Cuyahoga
10 Falls of how to approve this site plan ordinance. The --
11 the site plan procedures were set forth, permitted for a
12 record to be developed, and there was a -- planning
13 commission meetings. There was the city council meetings.
14 And if the city council or the planning commission had
15 denied our right to the site plan ordinance and its
16 benefits, we would have a right under Ohio law to go under
17 the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act and get a court to
18 review that issue.

19 QUESTION: Because there would have been
20 official action. And that's the problem here, that
21 there -- do you -- do you call a referendum that's put on
22 the ballot because 10 percent of the electorate had signed
23 petitions -- do you call that State action, which is
24 subject to the equal protection surveillance? I had
25 thought that that's a -- that's an initiative of the

1 people and it's not action of the city.

2 MR. KRAMER: Well, the only reason why the
3 people are able to get a referendum is because the city
4 charter, which is their constitution, permitted that.

5 QUESTION: But that permitted it 30 years ago,
6 did it not?

7 MR. KRAMER: That's right, but in the -- the due
8 process area, Your Honor, we're not talking about
9 discriminatory intent. All we're talking about is looking
10 at whether the procedure set forth is fundamentally flawed
11 and does it -- is it arbitrary and capricious and not
12 substantially related to the general welfare as -- as this
13 Court has talked about ever since --

14 QUESTION: But there are all kinds of nutty
15 referendum measures that voters put forward. I -- your
16 theory would seem to subject a State or a city or whatever
17 it is to a lawsuit every time there's one of these nutty
18 proposals put forward.

19 MR. KRAMER: No. We're talking about whether
20 you have to have a -- a protected property interest and
21 you also have to have a situation where there is a
22 arbitrary and capricious action.

23 In this case, we have ownership of property,
24 which under the original intention of -- of the Framers of
25 the Constitution, ownership of private property and the

1 ability to develop using this property for a lawful
2 purpose is protected by the Due Process Clause. And when
3 you look at the issue --

4 QUESTION: But your theory, as I understand it,
5 is that there was -- if it was racially motivated, there
6 was just sort of an arbitrary. There was an absence of a
7 legitimate reason for the delays and the shenanigans and
8 so forth. But it seemed to me the same argument could --
9 could be made if they were trying to protect the wetlands,
10 and they used the same kind of shenanigans.

11 MR. KRAMER: Well, Your Honor, we certainly
12 raised the question about if this was a discriminatory
13 motive, that would mean that there would not be -- under
14 general welfare.

15 QUESTION: There would be no racial basis.

16 MR. KRAMER: But more importantly, our argument
17 is that there is a per se violation whenever you have an
18 administrative matter which should be taken up through the
19 city council or through the courts or through a -- from --
20 from an administrative agency like the planning
21 commission.

22 And the evidence in the record, as the lower
23 courts point out, is that we met all the requirements for
24 the city to -- to get our site plan. And then, when the
25 city council approved it, when the planning director said

1 we met or exceeded the site plan ordinance, they put it to
2 a referendum and they asked 20,000 voters to approve or
3 disapprove a site plan ordinance, they never saw and
4 the -- and whether or not that site plan ordinance
5 conformed to the building and zoning code that they never
6 read. If that is not --

7 QUESTION: No. But what your -- what your
8 argument boils down to is to say that there is a
9 recoverable substantive due process violation whenever a
10 property right of yours is interfered with by a misuse of
11 the legislative process, even a temporary one. Isn't that
12 the -- the nub of your claim?

13 MR. KRAMER: I would say we -- we are asking for
14 a fairly narrow interpretation. We're saying if it's an
15 administrative matter which should not be subject to the
16 decision of voters because this is not legislative --

17 QUESTION: But what -- from the standpoint of
18 your claim, why does it matter whether it -- it was a
19 legislative use countering an administrative action, or
20 whether it was a legislative use with a racial motive? It
21 is an improper use of a legislative procedure. And you're
22 saying, as I understand it, whenever that, in fact, is
23 effected, there -- and -- and you can -- you can make a --
24 a colorable claim of -- of some economic damage, that you
25 have a substantive due process right to recover. Isn't

1 that correct?

2 MR. KRAMER: Justice Souter, we -- that is
3 something that we have raised in our brief, but we have --
4 also have raised a much narrower issue which would be
5 simply looking at a site plan ordinance, should it be
6 subjected to a popularity contest? There -- it's
7 standard-less. This Court has ruled in --

8 QUESTION: You never mentioned procedural due
9 process in your brief. The first mention I heard of it is
10 in your argument here, where you say it doesn't matter
11 whether it's substantive or procedural. Your brief went
12 entirely to substantive due process.

13 MR. KRAMER: Well, the reason that we didn't
14 raise that is the Court didn't certify a question other
15 than to substantive due process. We believe that it
16 really subsumes that issue when you look at -- the
17 procedure itself is so fundamentally flawed. It is very
18 similar to the -- the situation in the City of Eastlake
19 that this Court looked at.

20 QUESTION: Would you say -- be saying that if
21 the Ohio court had stuck to its original position?
22 I mean, it was four/three both times.

23 MR. KRAMER: Well, the Ohio court in both cases,
24 Justice Ginsburg, first ruled that it was an
25 administrative matter.

1 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Kramer.

2 MR. KRAMER: Thank you, Chief Justice.

3 QUESTION: Mr. Nager, you have 3 minutes
4 remaining.

5 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GLEN D. NAGER

6 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

7 MR. NAGER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

8 With respect to the disparate impact claim, I
9 would just like to clarify that we were the petitioners,
10 and the Court did grant certiorari on the issue and there
11 is a judgment of the Sixth Circuit against my clients on
12 that issue. And while they've abandoned the claim and
13 declined to defend the Sixth Circuit's judgment, we would
14 request the Court vacate that judgment and instruct that
15 the disparate impact claim be dismissed with prejudice.

16 With -- Justice Breyer, with respect to your
17 questions to my opposing counsel, a point we'd like to add
18 to what you had to say is simply that if we had done what
19 they wanted, we would have been subjected to a damages
20 claim. It would have been a First Amendment claim by the
21 citizens seeking to put something on the ballot by
22 initiating a petition, and it -- it can't be that in order
23 to avoid a Fourteenth Amendment damages claim, we have to
24 violate other people's First Amendment rights.

25 If the Court doesn't have any further questions,

1 we have nothing further.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Nager.

3 The case is submitted.

4 (Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the case in the
5 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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